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Abstract: 
In urban China, urban resident annual earnings are 1.3 times larger than long term rural 
migrant earnings as observed in a nationally representative sample in 2002. Using 
microsimulation, we decompose this difference into four sources, with particular attention to 
path dependence and statistical distribution of the estimated effects: (1) different allocation to 
sectors that pay different wages (sectoral effect); (2) hourly wage disparities across the two 
populations within sectors (wage effect); (3) different working times within sectors (hours 
effect); (4) different population structures (population effect). Although sector allocation is 
extremely contrasted, with very few migrants in the public sector and very few urban 
residents working as self-employed, this has no clear impact on differential earnings. Indeed, 
the sectoral effect is not robust to the path followed for the decomposition. We show that the 
migrant population has a comparative advantage in the private sector: increasing its 
participation into the public sector would not necessarily improve its average earnings. The 
second main finding is that the population effect is robust and significantly more important 
than wage or hours effects. This implies that the main source of disparity between the two 
populations is pre-market (education opportunities) rather than on-market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The urban labor market in China has gone through tremendous changes over the last 
three decades of economic reforms. One of the most dramatic over the recent years is related 
to rural-urban migration that has soared with the loosening of administrative controls over 
population movements between rural and urban areas. Although it is difficult to evaluate 
precisely the actual number of rural migrants in Chinese cities, estimations reported by the 
National Bureau of Statistics amount to 132 million rural workers in cities in 2006 (National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2007)1. 
For decades since the late 1950s, the overall distribution of the Chinese population had 
been shaped by the strict policy of the household registration (hukou) system, which aimed at 
restricting migrations both between rural and urban areas and across regions. The main 
institutional barrier to mobility was then the exclusion of rural residents from the urban 
welfare system, which provided food ration, housing, medical care, education, childcare, and 
pension to urban residents. This system made it practically very difficult, if not impossible for 
rural hukou holders to survive in cities. 
Economic reforms implemented from the late 1970s onwards have increased both the 
supply of and the demand for rural migrants in urban areas. As a consequence, population 
movements have risen sharply although not smoothly especially during the 1990s. Labor 
surplus in agriculture combined with reduced employment opportunities in township and 
village enterprises, increasing demand for labor by the booming urban private sector as well 
as a central government’s policy of laisser-faire towards rural migration first fostered rural 
population movements to urban areas in the early 1990s. As a consequence, the number of 
rural migrants jumped from about 30 million in 1989 to 62 million in 1993 (Li, 2007). 
However, the reform of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dramatically changed the situation 
faced by rural migrants because millions of urban laid-off workers entered the urban labor 
market after 1997. The harder competition on the urban labor market between urban 
unemployed and rural migrants was further reinforced by administrative regulations against 
rural migrants. By the end of the 1990s, several city governments had implemented local 
regulations to restrict rural migrants’ employment and even forced enterprises to lay off 
migrant workers in favor of urban local workers. Other administrative regulations included a 
restricted access to certain job positions to urban residents only, or the imposition of fees to 
                                                 
1 Given that 20% of rural migrant workers are estimated to live with their family in urban areas, the total number 
of rural-urban migrant population is estimated at around 160 million in 2006.  
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migrant workers and their employers (Knight et al. 1999, Appleton et al. 2004, Knight and 
Yueh 2004a, 2004b, Zhao 2005). This official administrative discrimination against rural 
migrants prevailed until recently when the central government issued a series of documents 
explicitly requiring local governments to enforce equal opportunities in employment and 
rights for rural migrants (Li, 2007). This change in policy towards rural labor mobility made 
the flow of rural migrants jumping again from about 80 million in 2001 to 132 million in 2006. 
As it is often the case when two distinct labor force groups are competing in a labor 
market, the growing participation of rural migrants in the Chinese urban labor market raises 
the issue of potential discrimination behaviors against migrants. And indeed, various 
difficulties faced by rural migrants in terms of income and working conditions have been 
highlighted in the literature. Besides low income, the delayed payment of wages is a common 
feature for rural migrants. Their job mobility is much higher than local urban workers (Knight 
and Yueh 2004a) and they seldom have a contract signed with their employers. Their working 
conditions are tough, and they usually work much longer than the legal working time in low-
end jobs that local urban workers do not want to take2 (Yao 2001, Li 2007). As emphasized 
by Zhao (2005), the hukou system still makes it very difficult for rural migrants to enter the 
formal sector. Measures of perceived discrimination by rural migrants themselves illustrate 
these points by showing that in many aspects rural migrants consider that they do not enjoy 
the same treatment as urban workers. As an example, the Chinese Household Income Project 
(CHIP) 2002 survey data used in this paper indicate that 70% of rural migrants perceive 
discrimination in terms of wage paid for equal work, 71% in terms of type of work and 61% 
in terms of working hours. The disadvantaged position of rural migrants is not limited to 
earnings differentials and working conditions. Again, according to CHIP data, 81% of rural 
migrants consider being discriminated against in their chance to be promoted, 82% in housing 
provision, and 85% in social security. 
This paper intends to contribute to the understanding of the discriminatory behaviors 
against rural migrants by specifically focusing on the explanation of earnings differentials 
between rural migrants and urban residents. To that purpose, we use a nationally 
representative sample of urban residents and rural migrants for the year 2002 and we propose 
an extended form of Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions to explain the observed earnings 
differentials between the two populations. One important issue raised in the literature 
                                                 
2 The construction sector is a typical example here. According to the Project Team of Research Council, State 
Council (2006), data from the 2000 Census indicate that 80% of all the jobs in the construction sector are taken 
by rural migrants. These jobs are typically low-skilled, hard and dangerous, and as such are not valued by urban 
residents. 
 4
concerns the respective contribution of different allocations into sectors versus different 
wages earned within each sector, what Liu et al. (2004) refer to as between- and within-
occupation wage effect. We explore this question by focusing on two possible sources of 
segregation: (1) a differentiated access to sectors (we distinguish here the public sector, the 
private sector and self-employment); and (2) differentiated earnings within each sector. 
Although the evolution of the labor market in urban China has received a large 
attention, evaluations of the earnings gap between rural migrants and urban residents in China 
remain limited, mainly because of the paucity of relevant data. Even when adequate data is 
available, their scope tends to be limited to a few regions or cities (Knight et al. 1999, Meng 
2001, Meng and Zhang 2001). Given the huge regional differences across China, this 
limitation makes cross-study comparisons difficult and any generalization irrelevant. The 
most in-depth analysis of earnings differentials between rural migrants and local urban 
workers in China to date is certainly that of Meng and Zhang (2001). Using two comparable 
household survey data sets for Shanghai in 1995, they find evidence of discrimination against 
rural migrants in terms of both occupational attainment and earnings. Following the 
methodology of Brown et al. (1980), they analyze the extent to which earnings differentials 
between rural migrants and urban residents are due to inter- or intra-occupational gaps and 
find that 82 percent of the hourly wage differential is due to unequal payment within 
occupation. 
This paper tries to provide a general overview of earnings differentials between rural 
migrants and urban residents in China, using data from a nationally representative sample for 
2002 made of comparable surveys for urban residents and rural migrants. The data set was 
collected under the China Household Income Project (CHIP), and contains about 8,000 
observations for working individuals. It not only provides a wider scope than previous 
analyses, but also enables the comparison of two sub-populations that may be in strong 
competition for jobs in urban China. Indeed, rural migrants surveyed in the CHIP data were 
selected from resident communities (Khan and Riskin, 2005). Although not capturing the 
wide spectrum of rural migrants (those living in construction sites and factories were excluded 
from the sampling process), these data are relevant for the purpose of our study since the 
surveyed migrants, already settled in cities, can be expected to have characteristics closer to 
urban residents against whom they are competing in the labor market.  
Furthermore, we adopt a decomposition analysis based on microsimulation that 
substantially departs from the traditional approach based on the Brown et al. (1980) extension 
of Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions. Our approach, formally based on sector allocation models 
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allows for the evaluation of direct as well as indirect effects of changes in sector allocation on 
earnings differentials. In particular, it shows differences in comparative advantages between 
sectors for rural migrants and urban residents in the urban labor market. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the decomposition 
methodology and section 3 describes the data used. Occupational distribution and wages and 
hours structures are discussed respectively in section 4 and 5. Section 6 presents the results of 
the decomposition analysis and discusses the various effects at stake. Concluding remarks are 
given in section 7. 
 
 
2. Decomposition methodology 
 
On average, our dataset shows that urban residents earn 1.3 times as much as rural 
migrants in 2002. We decompose this gap into 4 complementary effects: (1) the effect of 
different allocations between self-employment, public jobs and private jobs; (2) the effect of 
different hourly earnings structures; (3) the effect of different working times; and (4) the 
effect of the distribution of observed individual characteristics in the two populations. The 
decomposition is implemented by first estimating job allocation, earnings and hours equations, 
and then simulating counterfactual job status, earnings and hours. 
The traditional approach to decomposition in this context follows the Brown et al. 
(1980) extension to Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, which explicitly treats differences in 
occupational distributions between the two groups under investigation. This method has been 
applied in particular by Liu et al. (2004) for Hong Kong and Meng and Zhang (2001) for 
China. Our approach, however, is substantially different from the Brown et al. model in that it 
takes into account the fact that participation changes have indirect effects on within sector 
average earnings, as they affect population composition in the sectors. As will be illustrated, 
taking this dimension into account may greatly affect the results. 
 
 2.1. Model 
To decompose the difference in average earnings between urban residents and rural 
migrants, we start with the following model. We consider two groups of workers, urban 
residents (u) and rural migrants (m), who can work into 3 different sectors indexed by k = 1, 2, 
3 (self-employment, public sector and private sector). If Z is a vector of individual 
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characteristics, the individual latent propensity to work in sector k for a person i belonging to 
group g = {u, m} is assumed to be of the form: 
k
i
gk
i
k
i ZP ηδ +=  
where the parameters δgk are group and sector specific. A person is observed working in sector 
k if { }jijki PP max= . 
Within each sector k, hourly earnings are given by: 
k
i
gk
i
k
i uXw += βlog  
where X is a subset of Z that contains human capital variables. Working time is given by: 
k
i
gk
i
k
i vZh += γ  
These parameters can have various interpretations. As a general setting, the 
propensities to be found working in a sector, as well as the working time in that sector, may 
depend on: (i) the expected income in sector k, (ii) individual preferences for sector k, and (iii) 
a restricted access to some sectors for some groups. Since the above specifications are 
reduced forms, the parameters δgk and γgk can capture both preferences and constraints. In 
particular, a difference between δuk and δmk can be explained by occupational segregation 
(demand driven) between urban residents and rural migrants as well as by different 
preferences (supply driven) across the two populations. Differences in earnings parameters βgk 
are more readily interpretable in terms of segmentation, although they could also reflect 
compensating differentials. 
The sector allocation model is estimated by maximum likelihood using a multinomial 
logit model. Residuals kiη  are thus assumed to be i.i.d, with a Gumbell distribution 
(McFadden, 1973). In this model, the probability to work in sector k is:  
∑= j gji
gk
i
i Z
ZZk
)exp(
)exp()Pr( δ
δ  
if i belongs to group g. The sectoral choice model can also be used to correct for selectivity in 
earnings equations (Bourguignon et al., 2007). Yet, achieving identification in the selectivity 
model is problematic since no available variable can be considered as a fully exogenous 
instrument. However, in an attempt to control for possible selectivity bias, we estimated 
selectivity-corrected earnings functions but found no quantitative difference for the general 
results (see Appendix 3). We therefore present results based on models estimated without 
selectivity correction (earnings and hours equations are estimated by ordinary least squares) to 
keep the presentation and discussion simple. 
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2.2. Decomposition 
To present the decomposition methodology, the above model is embedded into a more 
general notation. If we note δg the full vector of sector choice parameters specific to any 
group g, and βg and γg accordingly, the observed differential in average income between the 
two populations can be decomposed into four parts as follows: 
1. The part due to different activity generating processes (δu versus δm), through the 
simulation of the sector in which urban residents would be working if they had the 
same activity allocation rule as migrants, and inversely. 
2. The part due to different hourly earnings generating processes (βu versus βm), through 
the simulation of how much urban residents would be paid if they were paid according 
to the migrants’ earnings generating model in a given activity, and inversely. 
3. The part due to different hours generating processes (γu versus γm), through the 
simulation of how long urban residents would be working if their working time model 
was that of migrants, and inversely. 
4. The part due to a different distribution of observed characteristics Z in the two 
populations. 
Dropping hours for clarity, a typical decomposition in the Brown et al. (1980) 
approach would be: 
∑
∑
∑
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where ),( uk us δ is the proportion of urban residents (u) in sector k when the sector allocation 
rule is δu, and ),( uk uw β  is the average hourly earnings of urban residents actually observed 
in activity k when the hourly earnings generating process is βu.  
This algebraic decomposition works well when the activity dimension is absent, as in 
the original Blinder-Oaxaca approach. However, including activity in the decomposition 
generates composition effects across sectors: by changing the sector allocation rule (e.g. from 
δu to δm) while keeping the rest constant (notably the earnings generating process), the 
average earnings in each sector is modified accordingly because the individuals allocated to 
each sector are not the same any more. This is part of the activity effect. In contrast, the above 
 8
decomposition uses observed average earnings ( ),( uk uw β ) to evaluate the effect of activity 
changes. Such earnings level has no counterfactual meanings. This is an important issue if 
some variables do affect the sectoral allocation differently in the urban and the migrant 
models. This problem is specific to the introduction of activity choice and does not appear in 
the original Oaxaca-Blinder approach. 
As a result, we propose the following decomposition:  
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   (1) 
where 1[.] is an indicator variable, ui ∈  means all individuals i belonging to the urban 
resident population and U is the total size of this population (resp. m and M for migrants). 
Line 1 minus line 2 gives the sector allocation effect (δu vs. δm), the third line gives the 
earnings effect (βu versus βm) and line 4 minus lines 5 gives the population effect3. 
Implementing this decomposition requires simulating individual counterfactual 
occupations. To that aim, we initially draw values of η for each individual, conditional on Z 
and his/her observed activity. We then use these drawn values to determine the allocation into 
counterfactual sectors. For instance, if individual i is a migrant and has received ( Kii ηη ˆ...ˆ1 ) 
compatible with her observed sector, her urban resident sector allocation counterfactual will 
be ]),([ kZs ui =δ  if { }jiujijkiuki ZZ ηδηδ ˆmax)ˆ( +=+ . Earnings and hours counterfactuals also 
plug in residuals uˆ  and vˆ  based on observed status4. 
A last issue, often overlooked in the literature, is path-dependence. The sector 
allocation effect in equation (1) is computed on the urban resident population and using the 
urban resident earnings determination rule βu. But it could also be based on the rural migrant 
population, or with βm, or both. There is no reason to expect that the effect will be identical 
                                                 
3 If hours had not been dropped for legibility, there would be an additional term showing the working hours 
effect. 
4  Whenever the individual is not simulated in her original sector, she is given a residual value from the 
destination sector observed distribution, so that her rank in her initial distribution is preserved.  
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for all combinations. The same holds for each term of the above decomposition, so that the 
contribution of the various terms can be sensitive to the chosen path. It is thus necessary to 
compute every variant and check the robustness of the results. 
An interesting situation where path-dependence can be important occurs when the 
optimal sector allocation rules are very different for the two populations. In that case, no 
allocation is generally superior. Consider for example the case where urban residents are 
better paid than migrants in every sector, but migrants receive higher wages in the private 
sector, whereas urban residents receive higher wages in the public sector. Since urban 
residents are far more concentrated in the public sector than migrants, the result of moving 
from δu to δm (sector allocation effect) will be to decrease the share of the public sector. 
Depending on the model chosen for generating earnings, this shift would either decrease 
(urban residents earnings model) or increase (rural migrants earnings model) overall income. 
This is a situation that will appear in the data. 
 
3. Data 
 
The data used in this paper has been collected during spring 2003 under the China 
household income project (CHIP), coordinated by the Institute of Economics, Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, with assistance from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 
The urban section of the household income survey contains two distinct sub-samples, one on 
urban hukou households and the other on households living in urban areas without urban 
hukou. These rural-urban migrant households are selected from the same twelve provinces5 as 
urban households, but not from all of the cities included in the urban survey. Since rural-urban 
migrants are mostly concentrated in large cities, the provincial capital cities plus one or two 
medium-sized cities in each province have been selected for the migrant survey. We restrict 
our analysis to cities common to the two sub-samples and to individuals aged 16 to 60 who 
declared working at least part of the year and earning wages or income from self-employment. 
The sample contains 4,978 observations for urban hukou working individuals and 3,035 
observations for rural migrants. 
The sample scheme for the rural migrant survey was to allocate 200 households to 
each province in the coastal and interior regions and 150 households to each province in the 
western region. Within each province, 100 households were drawn from the capital city and 
                                                 
5 The twelve provinces are: Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan. 
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50 households from other cities. Within cities, only rural-urban migrant households living in 
residential neighborhoods were sampled. This implies that migrant workers living on 
construction sites or in factory dormitories are not accounted for (Khan and Riskin, 2005)6.  
With little outside knowledge about the distribution of the migrant population by age, 
gender and location, it is difficult to make a judgment on how representative the migrant data 
is. This judgment also depends on how migrant households are defined. As indicated in some 
statistics from rural-urban individual migrants, the majority of migrants are single workers 
living in dormitories or construction sites. However, these single migrant workers are not our 
analysis unit since they experience temporary and short-term migration, with lower 
expectation to settle down with their families in cities. The migrant households covered in our 
sample are rather representative of long-term migrants living with their family and, as such, 
more directly comparable to local urban households. The average length of stay in cities for 
rural migrants is 7.34 years at survey year and 50% have been living in cities for more than 6 
years; more than 75% had been staying in cities for the whole year. 
Although the information collected in the two sub-surveys is meant to be consistent 
(with similar questions asked in the two surveys), earnings deserve particular attention. For 
urban hukou holders, questions concerning earnings are rather comprehensive. As discussed 
in the literature, the CHIP data is particularly careful with earnings measures: although it does 
not fully account for all fringe benefits provided by the public sector (such as implicit 
contribution to pensions, health insurance, or preferential housing rents), it includes some 
important non-monetary benefits (e.g. housing, medical care, child care and regional 
subsidies).  
For urban hukou holders, the earnings variable is thus defined as the individual income 
of active workers earned from their own private business or work units7. For wage-earners, it 
is the sum of cash labor compensations (basic salary, bonuses, allowances, subsidies and other 
wages or income) and income in kind. For rural migrants, earnings are computed from the 
reported average monthly income in 2002 from their current job and the total (net) income 
from other sources. Available data do not allow us to take income in kind into account for 
rural migrants, which may slightly bias upward the observed income gap between migrants 
                                                 
6 A full description of the sampling method and the data can be found in Li et al. (2007). 
7  Measuring income for self-employed is a highly debated issue. A recent paper by de Mel et al. (2008) 
compares the relative quality of direct reports of profits with details of revenues and expenses, and concludes 
that the former are likely to be more accurate in measuring firms’ profits. In this vein, our earnings variable is 
based on reported net income of private businesses. 
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and urban residents. However, given that rural migrants have restricted access to subsidized 
services, this should not be a serious issue.  
An important component of earnings differentials in China may arise from differences 
in living standards between different cities. To account for this issue, earnings are adjusted for 
provincial purchasing power differences, using Brandt and Holz (2006) urban provincial-level 
spatial price deflators. This adjustment makes cross-provinces data much more comparable 
than the non-deflated data usually used in the literature. 
Table 1 shows statistics on sector allocation, average earnings and working time by 
sector (self-employment, public sector and private sector). Urban residents’ annual earnings 
are 1.3 times larger than rural migrant earnings: 11,881 yuan vs. 9,335 yuan. This results from 
a large difference in hourly wage between the two populations that is compensated by longer 
migrant working hours. The hourly wage of urban residents is on average twice that of rural 
migrants, the ratio being much higher in the public sector (2.3) than in both self-employment 
(1.3) and the private sector (1.5). However, rural migrants work on average 69 hours per week, 
whereas urban residents work on average 44 hours a week. The fact that rural migrants, who 
receive lower hourly earnings, also tend to work longer may imply a strong income effect in 
labor supply behavior, but may also result from working constraints imposed by employers to 
workers with limited negotiating power. 
Table 1 also shows that occupational distributions are extremely contrasted across the 
two groups and, as such, this is a potentially important source of income differences, as 
sectors have different wage-setting structures (Chen et al., 2005). Indeed, there is a very 
strong concentration of rural migrants in self-employment and, to a lower extent, in the 
private wage-earning sector (respectively 57% and 36%), whereas urban residents are 
overwhelmingly employed in the public sector (71%) and only slightly in self-employment 
(4%). 
The comparison between the public and the private sector hourly wage structure also 
reveals an interesting difference between urban residents and rural migrants. Indeed, while 
urban residents working in the public sector get a much higher hourly wage than those 
working in the private sector (1.4 times higher), rural migrants earn slightly less in the public 
sector than in the private sector. 
Table 2 provides a description of individual characteristics, which highlights very 
important endowment differences between the two groups. Hence, urban residents are on 
average older and much more educated (almost 4 years difference) than rural migrants. As 
compared to the Shanghai sample used by Meng and Zhang (2001), migrants in our sample 
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are slightly older (34.31 versus 27.07) and most are married (90% versus 55%), which is 
consistent with the fact that we are focusing on less temporary migrants. Urban residents are 
also far more often members of the Communist Party and have much more experience than 
rural migrants, experience being measured by the actual number of years of work in urban 
areas. Last, in terms of job status, the lower average qualification of rural migrants is 
illustrated by their very low share in white collar jobs: only 4.5% of rural migrants hold 
professional or technician positions (to be compared with 32.7% of urban residents) and 2.2% 
are office workers (against 19.6% for urban residents).  
 
4. Occupational distribution 
 
As described in section 2, we can evaluate the extent to which the occupational 
distribution is “biased” against rural migrants by simulating the occupational distribution of 
each group using the other group’s sector allocation model. We first run a multinomial logit 
model over the choice of activity (self-employment, public sector, private sector), whose 
results are reported in Table 3. Explanatory variables include individual characteristics 
(education, age, gender, communist membership, geographical residence) as well as 
household characteristics (household size, number of children less than 6 years old).  
Education influences the choice of both urban residents and rural migrants towards the 
public sector, the estimated effect being significantly stronger for urban residents8. This 
implies that the urban resident model selects educated workers into the public sector much 
more strongly than does the rural migrant model. Moreover, although education increases the 
probability for rural migrants to work in the private sector as compared to self-employment, it 
does not significantly increase their chances to work in the public sector as compared to the 
private sector (which is not the case for urban residents).  
The impact of age on activity choice only appears significant for rural migrants. 
Estimations show an inverted U-shape relationship between age and the probability of 
entering self-employment: rural migrants in their early 40s have the highest probability to 
work as self-employed. A potential explanation is that young migrants entering the urban 
                                                 
8 Although coefficients absolute values are not directly comparable in Table 3, the significance of the difference 
between urban residents and rural migrants equations has been checked by pooling the data and adding 
interaction terms for all variables with a “migrant” dummy. 
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labor market mostly start working in the wage-earning sector and only switch to a more risky 
position when they have acquired enough economic, human and social capital9.  
From the multinomial logit model, we can simulate the sector allocation of each 
individual in the sample, under the rules that prevail in the other population. In other words, 
the simulation answers the question: “in which sector would urban residents (rural migrants) 
work if they were allocated to activities according to the rural migrants (urban residents) 
model?”. Table 4 compares the observed and the simulated marginal distributions.  
Shifting from the migrant model to the urban model decreases the share of self-
employment from 57% to 11% if applied to the migrant population and from 50% to 4% if 
applied to the urban population. Inversely, the same model change increases public sector 
share from 7% to 52% in the migrant population and from 14% to 72% in the urban 
population. The fact that the amplitude of these effects is sensitive to the population indicates 
that contrasted occupational distributions are only partly explained by a segregation (or model) 
effect and that population characteristics do play a role. However, it is interesting to note that 
the distribution of occupations based on the rural migrant model is much less sensitive to 
population changes than the distribution based on the urban model. This suggests that 
observed individual characteristics play a stronger role in the urban resident model than in the 
rural migrant model, as was already apparent from Table 310.  
 
5. Earnings and hours structures 
 
Six earnings and hours equations have been estimated, for self-employment, the public 
and the private sectors, and for the two populations (see Appendix A1 and A2). Table 5 
provides a synthetic view of the corresponding structures11. In order to neutralize within-
population composition effects, simulated hourly earnings (and working hours) are computed 
separately for the whole urban and migrant populations, and for each of the six self-
employment/public/private urban/migrant model combinations. For instance in panel A, the 
first row shows in the first column, the average hourly earnings for the whole urban resident 
population under the ‘urban/self-employment’ earnings model (i.e. based on βu,self), and in the 
second column, the average hourly earnings for the whole urban resident population under the 
‘migrant/self-employment’ earnings model (i.e. based on βm,self). It indicates that, if paid 
                                                 
9 This result is consistent with Meng (2001) who finds that, in 1995, rural migrants in Jinan city are more likely 
to be self-employed in the informal sector as their city work experience increases. 
10 In this respect, the population effect in the decomposition should be stronger whenever based on the urban 
occupation model (see section 6). 
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according to the urban rules, the urban population would earn 3.90 yuan per hour on average 
in self-employment, whereas, according to the migrant rules, the same population would earn 
only 3.11 yuan per hour in the same sector. 
Unsurprisingly, whatever the earnings model, the simulated wage for the urban 
population (left table) is always higher than the corresponding simulated wage for the migrant 
population (right table). Hence, for any wage structure, rural migrants earn less than urban 
residents, which is clearly a composition effect.  
Table 5 also shows that the urban resident’s earnings structure is always more 
favorable than the migrant’s earnings structure when applied to the urban population, but not 
when applied to the migrant population. Indeed, according to the urban resident earnings 
model, the average hourly earnings for the urban population would be 3.90 yuan in self-
employment, 5.92 yuan in the public sector and 4.93 yuan in the private sector, whereas 
according to the rural migrant earnings model, the corresponding average hourly wage for the 
same population would respectively be only 3.11 yuan, 5 yuan and 3.52 yuan. Results for the 
migrant population highlight a different pattern since, in the private sector, the migrant model 
is actually more favorable to migrants than is the urban resident model: the simulated hourly 
wage under the migrant earnings model (2.83 yuan) is higher than the simulated wage under 
the urban resident earnings model (2.61 yuan). 
Another interesting result is that the public sector always pays better than self-
employment and the private sector, except for migrants under the migrant model. Indeed, in 
the migrant model, both self-employment and the private sector are more favorable to 
migrants (with a simulated hourly wage of respectively 2.90 yuan and 2.83 yuan) than is the 
public sector (2.59 yuan per hour).  
These results suggest that migrants may have a comparative advantage with respect to 
self-employment and the private sector. Since this feature does not apply to the urban resident 
population, it is certainly related to some specific combinations of productive characteristics. 
One explanation lies in the nature of public jobs offered to migrants and in returns to human 
capital. Indeed, rural migrants generally hold low-end non-tenured jobs in the public sector, 
which are very poorly paid on average, but with some returns to education. On the other hand, 
self-employment and the private sector provide better paid jobs to migrants, but with smaller 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 The simple structure of weekly hours given in panel B does not deserve much explanation and will not be 
discussed here. The main result is that working hours are longer in self-employment and the private sector, as 
well as in the migrant model, with no exception. As urban residents are more concentrated in the public sector, 
this provides two reasons for the lower average working hours observed in this population.  
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returns to education12. As a result, in a population with a low education level, higher returns to 
education in the public sector do not make up for low baseline wages: public wages are lower 
on average. Hence, rural migrants are relatively better off in self-employment and the private 
sector where the returns to human capital are lower for them. In the more educated urban 
population, a higher return to schooling ensures that public wages are higher on average. As 
mentioned in section 2, this feature is likely to generate strong path-dependence in the sectoral 
decomposition because shifting migrants away from self-employment would not necessarily 
make them better off.  
 
6. Decomposition analysis 
 
Putting all these elements together, we can decompose the earnings differential 
between urban residents and rural migrants into activity, earnings, hours and population 
effects. As mentioned in section 2, there are several paths to the decomposition. For instance, 
the effect of changing the sector choice model can be computed either on the urban or on the 
migrant population, and in each case, using either urban or migrant earnings and hours models. 
This results in 8 different possibilities. To start with an overview, Table 6 presents the average 
effects over all paths, both in absolute value and as a percentage of the observed gap. 
The average observed difference in annual earnings is 2,546 yuan. If the two 
populations differed only by their allocation into sectors, this difference would be only -32 
yuan on average, or 2% of the total difference. Unsurprisingly, moving from the migrants’ 
hourly earnings model to the urban residents’ hourly earnings model would increase the 
earnings gap to 1,162 yuan (46% of the total). Inversely, everything else equal, migrants 
would earn 2,068 yuan more than urban residents as a result of their much longer working 
time (82% of the total). Finally, the strongest effect is related to differences in observed 
characteristics between the two populations: by itself, it generates a 3,487 yuan earnings 
difference. In a nutshell, this means that given the significant working time effect, urban 
residents would not earn much more on average if they did not have much better endowments, 
such as education and city work experience. This is reinforced by the fact that part of the 
hourly earnings effect may also capture unobserved productive characteristics that are not 
evenly distributed in the two populations (and should belong to the population effect)13. 
                                                 
12 Table A1 illustrates these differences in returns to schooling across sectors for migrants. 
13 A common limitation of the earnings differentials literature is that the constants incorporate differences in 
means of unobserved characteristics across populations. In this respect, we arbitrarily incorporate into 
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There are, however, several sources of uncertainty over the meaning of these averages. 
One is path dependence. Another comes from the fact that all counterfactual earnings are 
based on estimated parameters: if these parameters are not precisely estimated, we may well 
shift on one side or the other by mere chance. Therefore, it is important to take into account 
the variances of the estimators. Finally, some residuals follow from random draws, which 
brings additional randomness. 
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we have bootstrapped (200 times) the 
data so as to generate a distribution of occupation, earnings and hours equation parameters. 
For each of the 200 iterations, we have drawn new residuals and computed the effects along 
all possible paths. Figures 1 to 4 draw the resulting distribution of each of the four 
decompositions presented in Table 6, expressed as a percentage of the observed earnings gap. 
Each figure shows the full distribution for the different paths. For example, Figure 1 shows 
the distribution of the activity effect for the four possible paths: the urban population under 
the urban earnings/hour model (urbpop/urbwage), the urban population under the migrant 
earnings/hour model (urbpop/migwage), the migrant population under the urban 
earnings/hour model (migpop/urbwage), the migrant population under the migrant 
earnings/hour model (migpop/migwage). The sign of the hours and population decompositions 
(Figures 3 and 4) is robust, although the population effect is rather sensitive to the model of 
reference, as anticipated in section 414.  
Both the activity effect and the hourly earnings effect deserve specific attention. 
Figure 1 and Table 7 indicate that the small average activity effect actually hides strong path 
dependence. They both show the effect on total earnings of moving from the migrant to the 
urban occupation model, when applied alternatively to the urban and the migrant population 
and using the urban or the migrant earnings and hours structures. The effect is clearly positive 
when applied to the urban population using the urban earnings structure. In contrast, it is 
clearly negative when applied to the migrant population using the migrant earnings structure. 
Indeed, the effect of shifting from migrant activity (e.g. self-employment) to urban resident 
activity (e.g. public sector) increases total earnings with the urban wage model, whereas the 
effect of being more into the public sector decreases income under the migrant wage model. 
The main reason for this latter (negative) effect has been anticipated in section 5: migrants 
                                                                                                                                                        
differences in wage and participation structure (δ, γ, and β) across the two populations, what may in fact belong 
to an unobserved composition effect. As there is usually no natural experiment able to create exogenous 
variations in group identity, this is a general identification problem in the segmentation/discrimination literature. 
14  There are only two paths for the population decomposition because we have only computed exact 
decompositions for the sake of internal consistency: population change is computed once changes in all other 
parameters have been introduced, so that they rely either on all urban parameters or on all migrant parameters. 
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have a comparative advantage in the private sector or self-employment given their earnings 
generating structure. Since the urban occupation rules imply fewer people in self-employment 
and the private sector and more in the public sector, these rules are suboptimal for migrants 
under the migrant wage structure, and would imply lower incomes on average. Our results 
corroborate Meng and Zhang (2001) findings of a small impact of occupational segregation 
on the earnings gap between migrants and urban workers in Shanghai, but they also highlight 
the possibility of a strong path dependence that reveals interesting patterns. 
From Table 7, it seems that using the urban population and the migrant wage model 
generates a strong positive effect. However, Figure 1 clearly shows that this is an average 
over a very imprecise simulation, driven by a large right tail. As a result, the activity 
decomposition lacks robustness mainly because it is extremely path dependent and, to some 
extent, because of statistical imprecision. 
Regarding hourly wage, Figure 2 shows generally positive effects, although small and 
quite imprecise when applied to the migrant population using the migrant activity structure. 
Indeed, the urban resident earnings structure is most of the time more favorable, but the 
private sector pays better under the migrant model for the migrant population (Table 5). The 
impact of this on hourly earnings structures is small when the private sector has a limited 
weight (i.e. under the urban activity model) but it is strong under the migrant activity model. 
Figures A1 to A4 in Appendix 3 show the robustness of these results to the inclusion 
of selectivity correction in the earnings equations, with the activity decomposition being again 
very path dependent. The main difference lies in the fact that the distributions have much 
larger variances within each path, which comes from the fact that the selectivity model is less 
precisely estimated. 
Finally, it should be noted that employment in the public sector encompasses a variety 
of statuses. For urban residents, 95% are tenured jobs, most of the time as civil servants. 
However, rural migrants employed in the public sector are mostly under short-term contracts. 
As such, some of the differences in the public wage structures between urban and migrant 
employees may result from contrasted employment status and could arguably be interpreted 
as sectoral effects rather than wage segmentation. Therefore, we have reproduced the whole 
estimation and simulation procedure with all non-tenured public jobs allocated to the private 
sector category15. As shown in Table A4, the decomposition is not affected by this definition 
                                                 
15 We are left with only 2% of the migrant population in tenured public jobs (instead of 7% in all public jobs). 
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change: average effects are similar in magnitude and the small activity effect is again the 
result of contrasted paths. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper assesses the sources of the strong income differences between urban 
residents and long term rural migrants in contemporary urban China, using nationally 
representative data. In particular, we disentangle the effect of different earnings structures 
within self-employment, the private and the public sectors from the effect of a different 
allocation into sectors with different payments. This is important because migrants’ access to 
the public sector is very restricted, so that this could be expected to be an important source of 
income differences. 
A decomposition analysis based on microsimulations indicates that despite a much 
contrasted sectoral allocation, the impact of sector allocation on earnings differences is neither 
strong nor robust. We find a stronger, but only partly robust within sector earnings 
discrimination effect between urban residents and rural migrants. Explanations of these results 
can be found in the fact that the sector allocation and, to a lesser extent, the earnings effects, 
are path dependent in the decomposition because rural migrants have a comparative 
advantage into self-employment and the private sector: shifting into the public sector is not 
always advantageous to them, whereas it is for urban residents or using the urban resident 
earnings structure. This result may cast doubt on the literature that concludes to limited 
sectoral effects on wage contrasts without checking path dependence. 
Our findings on a segmented labor market between urban residents and rural migrants 
that reflects different comparative advantages are consistent with previous studies based on 
smaller datasets. Using data on 2,900 migrants surveyed in 1995 in 118 enterprises located in 
four cities, Knight et al. (1999) find that urban residents and rural migrants are highly 
imperfect substitutes in urban firms’ production function. Rural migrants are both able to bear 
hardships and easily manageable, two “assets” that make them accept jobs that non-migrants 
would not. Using data on 1,500 migrants in Jinan city in 1995, Meng (2001) finds that among 
rural migrants, those who possess higher human capital are more likely to be self-employed in 
the informal sector and are better off than those who work in the formal sector, which is 
consistent with our findings.  
Are rural migrants second-class workers in urban China? Our analysis suggests that 
segregation in terms of both access to jobs and on-the-job earnings is not the major 
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explanation for a large share of earnings differences between urban residents and rural 
migrants in 2002 as compared to differences in endowments. The strongest source of earnings 
differences is indeed found to be related to differences in population structures. The two 
populations are substantially different: rural migrants are younger, much less experienced and 
much less educated than urban residents. Pre-market discrimination, resulting mainly from 
lower education opportunity in rural areas, is thus more important in explaining earnings 
differences than any form of on-market discrimination resulting from sector allocation or 
earnings generating processes. The key policy implication of this result is to emphasize the 
importance of public policies towards rural education in order to reduce the endowment gap 
between rural migrants and urban residents in the urban labor market.  
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Table 1 – Earnings, working time and activity 
of urban residents and rural migrants in 2002 
 
 Urban residents Rural migrants Mean test 
Rural migrants Mean or % Std. Dev. Mean or % Std. Dev.  
Annual earnings 11,881 7,713 9,335 13,387 ** 
Self-employed 10,223 12,015 10,077 11,536 NS 
Public sector 12,742 7,435 6,967 5,139 ** 
Private sector 9,639 7,061 8,625 11,929 * 
Hourly wage 5.60 4.34 2.83 4.03 ** 
Self-employed 3.64 4.23 2.86 3.89 ** 
Public sector 6.14 4.51 2.64 2.16 ** 
Private sector 4.33 3.38 2.82 4.50 ** 
Weekly working time 44 11 69 19 ** 
Self-employed 61 20 74 17 ** 
Public sector 42 8 57 18 ** 
Private sector 46 12 64 18 ** 
Activity      
Self-employed 4.16%  56.97%   
Public sector 71.47%  7.08%   
Private sector 24.37%  35.95%   
      
# of obs. 4,978  3,035   
Notes: The mean test column indicates the significance level of mean differences between urban residents and 
migrants. NS non significant, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
Source: CHIP data, authors’ calculation. 
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Table 2 – Individual characteristics of urban residents and rural migrants in 2002 
 
 Urban residents Rural migrants 
 Mean or % Std. Dev. Mean or % Std. Dev. 
     
Years of schooling 11.72 2.88 7.97 2.71 
City work experience 20.71 9.73 7.15 5.01 
Age 40.71 9.07 34.31 8.09 
Male 56.33%  56.51%  
Ethnic minority 3.42%  8.27%  
Communist membership 29.07%  3.13%  
Married 87.06%  89.95%  
Household size 3.12 0.68 2.77 0.91 
Long-term tenure 74.16%  5.09%  
Professional or 
technicians 
32.74%  4.48%  
Office workers 19.62%  2.17%  
Workers 42.01%  32.52%  
Self-employed 4.16%  56.97%  
     
# of obs. 4,978  3,035  
Notes: Mean differences between urban residents and migrants are all significant at 1% level, except for the 
“male” variable. “City work experience” is measured as actual number of years of work in urban areas.  
Source: CHIP data, authors’ calculation.  
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Table 3 – Estimation of the Multinomial Logit Model for occupational choice 
 
 
Public sector 
versus 
Self-employment 
Private sector 
versus 
Self-employment 
Private sector 
Versus 
Public sector 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Urban residents       
Years of schooling 0.255** 0.027 0.112** 0.028 -0.143** 0.014 
Age -0.072 0.092 -0.064 0.095 0.008 0.037 
Age2 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Coast 0.423** 0.197 0.692** 0.203 0.268** 0.082 
West 0.039 0.171 0.086 0.179 0.047 0.088 
Spouse of the household head -0.480** 0.165 -0.347** 0.172 0.133* 0.079 
Married -0.357 0.395 -0.794** 0.403 -0.437** 0.150 
# of children below 6 -0.107 0.258 -0.182 0.270 -0.075 0.132 
Household size -0.133 0.108 -0.008 0.112 0.125** 0.052 
Communist membership 0.931** 0.230 0.234 0.241 -0.697** 0.095 
Male -0.559** 0.164 -0.578** 0.170 -0.019 0.073 
Constant 1.303 1.727 2.448 1.766 1.145 0.719 
       
Rural migrants       
Years of schooling 0.072** 0.030 0.035** 0.016 -0.037 0.031 
Age -0.256** 0.065 -0.274** 0.039 -0.019 0.065 
Age2 0.004** 0.001 0.003** 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Coast 1.655** 0.202 0.326** 0.099 -1.329** 0.204 
West 1.251** 0.203 -0.303** 0.098 -1.554** 0.209 
Spouse of the household head -0.201 0.191 0.165 0.102 0.366* 0.197 
Married -0.404 0.309 -0.408** 0.176 -0.004 0.306 
# of children below 6 0.009 0.217 -0.082 0.109 -0.090 0.223 
Household size -0.223** 0.088 -0.055 0.048 0.168** 0.090 
Communist membership 1.020** 0.307 0.123 0.247 -0.897** 0.323 
Male 0.168 0.181 0.108 0.099 -0.060 0.186 
Constant 1.505 1.144 4.885** 0.659 3.380** 1.134 
# of observations  Urban residents: 4,978  Rural migrants: 3,035 
Log likelihood   Urban residents: -3,309  Rural migrants: -2,495 
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  
Source: CHIP data, authors’ calculation. 
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Table 4 – Observed and simulated occupational distribution  
of urban residents and rural migrants in 2002 
 
 Urban residents Rural migrants 
 Frequency % Frequency % 
# of obs. 4,978  3,035  
Occupation     
Observed     
Self-employed 207 4.2 1,729 57 
Public sector 3,558 71.5 215 7.1 
Private sector 1,213 24.4 1,091 36 
     
Simulated with the other group model   
Self-employed 2,499 50.2 328 10.8 
Public sector 712 14.3 1,582 52.1 
Private sector 1,767 35.5 1,125 37.1 
Source: CHIP data, authors’ calculation. 
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Table 5 – Counterfactual hourly earnings and working hours structures 
under various models by population group 
 
Panel A: Counterfactual hourly earnings structure under various models by population 
group 
 
Urban resident population 
(n=4,978) 
 Migrant population 
(n=3,035) 
Urban resident 
earnings model 
Migrant earnings 
model 
 Urban resident 
earnings model 
Migrant earnings 
model 
3.90 3.11 Self-employment model 3.08 2.90 
5.92 5.00 Public wage model 3.45 2.59 
4.93 3.52 Private wage model 2.61 2.83 
 
Panel B: Counterfactual weekly working hours structure under various models by 
population group 
 
Urban resident population 
(n=4,978) 
 Migrant population 
(n=3,035) 
Urban resident 
wage model 
Migrant wage 
model 
 Urban resident 
wage model 
Migrant wage 
model 
61.2 71.4 Self-employment model 63.9 74 
41.9 51.1 Public wage model 44.1 55.5 
45.7 59.5 Private wage model 50.2 64.4 
Source: CHIP data, authors’ calculation. 
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Table 6 – Decomposition of observed earnings gaps  
between urban residents and rural migrants, 2002 
Means over all observed paths 
 
 (Yuan) (%) 
Observed earnings gap 2,546  
Activity effect -32 -2% 
Hourly wage effect 1,162 +46% 
Working time effect -2,068 -82% 
Population effect 3,487 +138% 
Note: means over 200 bootstrapped replications – see Figures 1-4 for the full distributions. 
Source: CHIP data, authors’ calculation. 
 
Table 7 – Path dependence for the activity effect 
Means by path 
 
Population Wage/hours model Activity effect 
  (Yuan) (% of observed) 
Urban residents Urban residents 451 18% 
Urban residents Rural migrants 1,376 53% 
Rural migrants Rural migrants -1,270 -51% 
Rural migrants Urban residents -689 -27% 
Note: means over 200 bootstrapped replications – see Figures 1-4 for the full distributions. 
Source: CHIP data, authors’ calculation. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A1 - Earnings equations 
 Self-employment Public sector Private sector  
 Urban 
residents 
Rural 
migrants 
Urban 
residents 
Rural 
migrants 
Urban 
residents 
Rural 
migrants 
Years of schooling 0.042 0.037** 0.063** 0.073** 0.074** 0.036** 
 1.64 5.98 17.38 5.38 8.75 4.37 
City work experience 0.008 0.059** 0.048** 0.005 0.041** 0.063** 
 0.27 5.96 11.71 0.2 5 6.03 
City work experience2 0.0001 -0.0020** -0.0009** 0.0007 -0.0007** -0.0021** 
 -0.16 -4.1 -8.98 0.55 -3.08 -4.41 
Coast 0.144 0.181** 0.210** -0.173 0.397** 0.180** 
 0.88 4.22 9.13 -1.57 7.92 3.62 
West -0.332* -0.026 0.079** -0.285* 0.115* 0.003 
 -2.41 -0.69 3.26 -2.55 2.1 0.06 
Communist 0.010 0.057 0.156** -0.053 0.288** 0.504** 
 0.05 0.56 7.08 -0.37 4.5 3.97 
Male 0.390** 0.176** 0.109** 0.231* 0.140** 0.318** 
 3.15 5.21 5.42 2.61 3.21 7.43 
Constant 0.223 0.054 0.128* 0.066 -0.369** -0.097 
 0.59 0.84 1.99 0.39 -2.88 -1.11 
       
Observations 207 1,729 3,558 215 1,213 1,091 
R2  0.12 0.10 0.18 0.25 0.18 0.14 
Notes:  1. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total earnings. 
2. The reference category for regional location is the central region.  
3. Numbers in italics are t-statistics. * Significant at 5 percent level ** Significant at 1 percent level 
Source: CHIP data, authors’ calculation. 
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Appendix 2 
Table A2 – Working hours equations 
 Self-employment Public sector Private sector 
 Urban 
residents 
Rural 
migrants 
Urban 
residents 
Rural 
migrants 
Urban 
residents 
Rural 
migrants 
Years of schooling 20.72 -1.17 -5.69* -23.87 -23.96** -48.24** 
 0.68 -0.14 -2.29 -1.09 -3.29 -4.31 
City work experience -10.38 -2.66 -18.96** -22.21 -14.59 1.39 
 -0.31 -0.20 -5.09 -0.55 -1.59 0.10 
City work experience2 0.06 -0.03 0.37** 0.39 0.19 -0.12 
 0.06 -0.04 4.45 0.20 0.84 -0.20 
Coast 245.74 65.21 -57.80** 23.94 -209.18** -207.54**
 1.28 1.15 -3.64 0.14 -4.91 -3.13 
West 687.07** 363.46** -25.05 488.37* -124.04* 93.50 
 4.29 7.39 -1.51 2.73 -2.69 1.31 
Communist -184.32 -242.90 0.17 -75.73 -141.00* -250.93 
 -0.80 -1.80 0.01 -0.34 -2.59 -1.49 
# of children below 6 74.83 -180.73** -3.71 -255.09 -70.85 16.53 
 0.34 -3.45 -0.14 -1.52 -1.00 0.23 
# of children at school -101.32 -35.46 18.42 34.91 13.76 123.88* 
 -0.81 -1.14 1.25 0.31 0.33 2.68 
Married -314.62 329.35** 66.25** -97.82 68.87 -95.88 
 -1.18 3.49 2.18 -0.46 0.99 -1.18 
Male -43.50 -4.83 64.55** 3.78 182.09* -61.26 
 -0.30 -0.11 4.67 0.03 4.94 -1.08 
Constant 3274.73** 3514.66** 2362.30** 3185.18** 2817.03** 3841.76**
 6.58 28.63 53.06 10.32 25.65 29.03 
       
Observations 207 1,729 3,558 215 1,213 1,091 
R2 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.05 
Notes:  1. The dependent variable is the number of hours worked in a year. 
2. The reference category for regional location is the central region.  
3. Numbers in italics are t-statistics. * Significant at 5 percent level ** Significant at 1 percent level 
Source: CHIP data, authors’ calculation. 
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Appendix 3: Decomposition of observed earnings gaps 
with selectivity correction 
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Figure A1: Activity decompositions (w/ selectivity correction)
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Figure A2: Hourly wage decompositions (w/ selectivity correction)
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Figure A3: Hours decompositions (w/ selectivity correction)
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Figure A4: Population decompositions (w/ selectivity correction)
 
Source: CHIP data, authors’ calculation. 
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Appendix 4 
Table A4 – Decomposition of observed earnings gaps with public-tenure 
between urban residents and rural migrants, 2002 
Means over all observed paths 
 
 (Yuan) (%) 
Observed earnings gap 2,546  
Activity effect -86 -3.5% 
Hourly wage effect 1,837 67% 
Working time effect -1,835 -67% 
Population effect 2,828 104% 
Note: means over 200 bootstrapped replications. 
Source: CHIP data, authors’ calculation. 
